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Abstract
The purpose of this note is to estimate the relative impact of interdiction and land control
on the colombian cocaine market. The government interdicts part of the cocaine traffic and
controls part of the arable land with the aim of weakening this illegal market. Our estimation
depends on the price elasticity of the coca-leaf supply, in particular, the importance of the
land with respect to other factors in the production of coca-leaf.
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1 Introduction
The colombian cocaine market is imperfectly competitive. The narco-insurgency, a
collection of illegal groups such as FARC-EP, ELN, AUC and BACRIM, controls
the markets of coca-leaf and cocaine1. The government fights against the narco-
insurgency in two fronts: controlling the land where there is coca-leaf production
and interdicting the cocaine traffic.
The purpose of this note is to estimate the relative impact of interdiction and
land control on the colombian cocaine market. We build a vertically integrated
model following to Grossman and Mej´ıa (2008) and introduce the bilateral monopoly
remarked in UNODC and Government of Colombia (2013). We do not model the
dynamic conflict between government and narco-insurgency in each front.
The narco-insurgency sells the cocaine to international traffickers and buys the
coca-leaf to peasants, both in an imperfect competitive structure. Our estimation
depends crucially on the price elasticity of the coca-leaf supply. This elasticity
represents both the importance of land factor in the coca-leaf production and the
ability of the peasants to substitute it for other factors.
2 Peasants
The narco-insurgency has the portion a ∈ (0, 1) of arable land for producing coca-
leaf (cl). The peasants, located in that portion, produce cl at the price fixed by
the narco-insurgency. Let Acl be the technology and fcl the other factors used for
producing cl. The cl production function is given by:
cl = Acla
αfβcl;α + β = 1 (1)
Let pcl be the price of cl, w = 1 the price of fcl and FCcl the fixed cost of
producing cl. The profit function of the peasants is given by:
picl = pclAcla
αfβcl − fcl − FCcl
The problem is maximizing picl in fcl, the unique variable factor of the peasants.
The non-conditional fcl(pcl) demand is given by:
fcl(pcl) = (βpclAcla
α)
1
1−β (2)
Inserting (2) in (1) we arrive to the direct supply function of cl.
cl =
[
(βpcl)
βAcla
α
] 1
1−β
Let εcl,pcl =
∂cl
∂pcl
pcl
cl
be the price elasticity of the cl supply. In this case, εcl,pcl =
β
1−β .
The inverse supply function, which we will use for solving the cocaine trafficker
problem, is given by:
pcl(cl) =
1
β
(
cl1−β
Acla
α
) 1
β
(3)
1We consider the insurgent and contra-insurgent groups as an agent because there is no any substantial difference
in the way they control the markets.
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3 Narco-insurgency
The narco-insurgency produces and traffics cocaine (c) using cl and a fixed portion
of other factors (f c). It sells c to international traffickers and buys cl to peasants.
Let Ac be the technology for c. The c production function is given by:
c = Accl
γf
ϕ
c ; γ + ϕ = 1 (4)
Let τc ∈ (0, 1) be the proportion of c surviving the governmental interdiction,
pc(c) the exogenous c demand and FCc the fixed cost of using f c. The profit function
of the narco-insurgency is given by:
pic = pc(c)τcc− pcl(cl)cl − FCc (5)
Using pc(c) = c
−δ with 0 < δ < 1 and pcl(cl) as it is in (3) we re-write (5) as:
pic = τc(Accl
γf
ϕ
c )
1−δ − 1
β
(
cl
Acla
α
) 1
β
− FCc
The problem is maximizing pic in cl. The solution for the cl market is given by:
cl∗ =
[
β2τcγ(1− δ)(Acfϕc )1−δ(Aclaα)
1
β
] β
1−βγ(1−δ)
(6)
p∗cl =
1
β
[
β2τcγ(1− δ)(Acfϕc )1−δ(Aclaα)
γ(1−δ)−1
1−β
] 1−β
1−βγ(1−δ)
(7)
Notice cl is directly related with a and τc, and pcl is directly related with τc
but inversely related with a. According to UNODC and Government of Colombia
(2013), pcl and cl tend to be stable in the short-run, which may be explained from
a balloon-effect in Acl and Ac.
The solution for the c market is given by:
c∗ =
[
β2τcγ(1− δ)(Acfϕc )
1
γβ (Acla
α)
1
β
] γβ
1−βγ(1−δ)
(8)
p∗c =
[
β2τcγ(1− δ)(Acfϕc )
1
γβ (Acla
α)
1
β
]− δγβ
1−βγ(1−δ)
(9)
Notice c is directly related with a and τc, but pc is inversely related with them.
Given the elastic c demand, the narco-insurgency gets important profits from a
competitive pc and an increasing c. In this sense, increments in Ac and Acl neutralize
the reductions of a and τc from the governmental policies.
4 Estimation
The narco-insurgency links the markets of cocaine and coca-leaf in Colombia. It
allows us to explain the cocaine market from the coca-leaf market and vice versa.
Let us use equations (6) and (8) to compare the impact of τc and a on the productions
of c and cl:
3
∂c/∂τc
∂c/∂a
|a=τc =
∂cl/∂τc
∂cl/∂a
|a=τc=
β
α
(10)
The proportions in the equation (10) depend directly on the price-elasticity of
the coca-leaf supply. In particular, an elastic coca-leaf supply, which is β > 0.5,
implies α < 0.5, leaving us with ∂c/∂τc > ∂c/∂a and ∂cl/∂τc > ∂cl/∂a. On the
other case, β < 0.5 implies ∂c/∂τc < ∂c/∂a and ∂cl/∂τc < ∂cl/∂a.
5 Discussion
Understanding the coca-leaf market is important for understanding the cocaine mar-
ket. The relative impact of interdiction and land control on the cocaine market
depends on the importance of land respect to other factors in the coca-leaf produc-
tion. Specifically, if the coca-leaf production is not intensive in the land factor then
interdiction would be better policy than land control.
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